

ABSTRACTS

Valeria Bizzari: Unreal Worlds. A Comparison between Dreams and Psychoses

If you look for a detailed phenomenological analysis of peculiar kinds of quasi-imaginative experiences—such as dreaming— you will be disappointed by the fact that there is not a systematic account of this phenomenon and its related forms. The aim of my talk is therefore to sketch a phenomenology of the dream in what seems its most important characteristics. To do this, I will mainly follow two authors, Maria Zambrano and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, distant thinkers who share a vision of the dream as a life-world in continuity with the waking world—comprehensible only by adopting a non-rational gaze, such as that offered by poetry and myth. While in the first part of my contribution I will therefore outline a “phenomenology of dreaming”, in the second part I will compare dreams and psychoses, being guided by the following main questions:

How does the link between dreams and the waking consciousness change in cases of modified mental states, such as psychosis? Is there a difference between dream activities and psychotic experiences?

In fact, I believe that a phenomenological inquiry into dreaming can offer novel insights for debates that are not strictly philosophical: especially regarding the psychopathological context, where psychotic states have often been associated with dreams (Binswanger 1930; Jung 1936; Freud 1958; Minkowski 1997; Scarone et al. 2008). Clarifying the nature of dreaming can shed light on psychotic states as well: this is why I aim at testing the “similarity hypothesis” concerning the two experiences. If it is true that dreaming shares many features with psychotic states, understanding dreams and the dreaming subject is crucial for understanding delusional states, such as schizophrenia.

In fact, it has been argued that there are some qualitative similarities between dreaming and psychoses. The loss of the “as-if function” (Fuchs 2017), the detachment from common sense, the bizarre experiences of space and time and the presence of anomalous bodily experiences are only some of the shared features that make these two states very similar. Nonetheless, there are important differences also: in the psychotic delusion – and especially in the prodromal phase – the “perceptual faith” in the content is not as strong as in dreams. Instead, we can find a specific, the so-called “delusional,” mood (see Jaspers 1968; Fuchs 2005; Sass & Pienkos 2013), where subjects

“experience their surroundings as strangely unreal, as if they were seeing only artificial images instead of real objects. Objects look spurious, somehow manufactured or contrived; people seem to behave unnaturally, as if they were actors or impostors. It all feels like being in the center of an uncanny staging or pre-arranged scenes” (Fuchs 2020b, 127).

Furthermore, in delusions there is an overlap between the dream and the waking worlds that eclipses the possibility of tracing the continuity between them. In particular, the subject is unable to differentiate between the different states of consciousness and often finds herself stuck in a quasi-solipsistic state, unable to communicate with others. There is a missing eccentric position, and a lack of insight.

My phenomenological methodology is enriched and supported by the neuroscientific literature concerning the neural layers underlying the two types of phenomena (Weinberger et

al 2002; Schwartz et al 2002; Dobri et al 2020). The findings rendered through this multidisciplinary approach will not only further advance the philosophical, phenomenological research on a currently understudied topic, but will also contribute research in psychopathology, providing new insights allowing therapists and patients to navigate the different, yet interconnected life-worlds.

Liu Boda: “Husserl’s Ghost”: To What Extent Can We Imagine a Bodiless Kinesthesia?

For Husserl’s phenomenology, imagination is not only an act of consciousness but also serves a critical methodological role. Through eidetic reduction and imaginative variation, complex ideas can be deconstructed to reveal their essential elements by stripping away the non-essential. Husserl repeatedly applied this methodological imagination in various areas of his work without explicitly addressing it, as seen in his exploration of kinesthesia, one of the most complex concepts in his phenomenology. Although kinesthesia is typically understood as the subjective or inner perception of bodily movement, a more comprehensive reading of the relevant texts reveals that Husserl consistently attempts to define kinesthesia without the body. As the first task of my article, I will summarize Husserl’s classical description of kinesthesia, focusing on two key points: first, kinesthesia is not the impression content of consciousness but rather makes it possible, establishing a rigid distinction between representing (“darstellend” in German) and non-representing consciousness; second, and more importantly, in the process of constitution, kinesthesia represents a phase prior to embodiment and can be defined as the pure spontaneity of the ego. In the second part of my article, I will implement the imaginative operation following Husserl’s steps, but I will show that his ideas face several challenges. For instance, it appears that the distinction between representing and non-representing consciousness is not as rigid as Husserl suggests. Furthermore, even if we can imagine a bodiless kinesthesia, akin to a floating ghost, we cannot eliminate a kind of “minimal body,” such as the sense of localization or the organs of will. In the third part of my article, I will explain why Husserl seeks a bodiless kinesthesia, or, more specifically, the philosophical motivation behind his “purification” of kinesthesia. This purification is rooted in his strict distinction between what intrinsically belongs to the ego and what is non-ego (‘das Ichliche’ and ‘das Nicht-Ich’). In the final part, I will explore Husserl’s later works, where he offers new descriptions and perspectives on kinesthesia. Ultimately, by examining Husserl’s account of the development of kinesthesia (especially in childhood), I will demonstrate that generative phenomenology provides a more comprehensive and promising perspective on kinesthesia than the earlier egological approach.

Cristi Bodea: Disturbing “the power of composition”. Imagination, phantasy and wild essences in Marc Richir’s phenomenology

In my talk I will focus on the concepts of imagination and phantasy as developed by Marc Richir. In one of his earlier writings “imagination is to be conceived as being the dreamlike (*onirique*) and fantastical power of the world-phenomena themselves [...] the world-forming power of the world, namely both phenomenological schematism of the phenomenalisation and power of composition without any pre-given concept [...]” (M. Richir, *Nous sommes au monde*, p. 244 [my translation]). I will argue that influenced by Husserl’s concept of phantasia, Richir shifts the centre of interest from imagination to phantasy, and gives the later this particular “power of composition” reserved previously for imagination. Conceiving phantasy as producer of quasi-images and imagination as the sole producer of images, Marc Richir establishes a hiatus between the two, where phantasy and quasi-images belong to the phenomenological unconscious while imagination and images belong to the symbolical unconscious. Based on

this distinction I will analyse two cases of interest for the pathologies of the self, namely, compulsion to repeat and hallucination. My working hypothesis is that the two reflect different types of disturbances: compulsion to repeat is a disturbance of imagination, and hallucination is a disturbance of phantasy. I will conclude by asserting that, although no less symptomatic (i.e. causing malaise to the subject), disturbances of imagination are not an immediate threat for the self, as opposed to disturbances of phantasy where the self is powerless in the face of quasi-images that risk its “de-composition” (e.g. in schizophrenia). Finally, this allows me to make the assumption that imagination can have a positive impact on people with severe mental illness by shifting attention from the unstructured “wild” essences of quasi-images (Richir) to the more arranged and ordered function of images.

Cassandre Bois & Tudi Gozé: The Image and the Imaginary dimension of Corporeity: Henri Maldiney’s Reading of Gisela Pankow’s Work

The early 1960s is marked by Henri Maldiney’s interest in the study of psychology, within the framework of a broader reflection on the epistemological and existential conditions of human presence. In the academic year 1963-1964, Maldiney gave a series of lectures at the University of Lyon titled *"The Problem of Limits in the Constitution of the Self"*, which remained unpublished until recently. In these lectures, Maldiney successively explores the clinical perspectives of prominent figures in psychiatric phenomenology: Ludwig Binswanger, Roland Kuhn, and Gisela Pankow (1914-1998). The study of the work of this French neuropsychiatrist and psychoanalyst enables Maldiney to unveil a phenomenological anthropology based on an investigation of schizophrenic being-in-the-world, and on the innovative therapeutic method proposed by Pankow, namely the “dynamic structuration of body image”. This course, given in parallel with a General Philosophy course on the concept of imagination, delves into the concepts of “image du corps”, “phantasme”, and “images dynamiques”, emphasizing the fundamental imaginative dimension of the body’s experience.

In this presentation, we propose to reconstruct and critically engage with the theoretical encounter between Pankow’s thought and Maldiney’s anthropological perspective. We will first present the specificity of the concept of body image in Pankow’s work, in contrast to the psychoanalytic tradition, and then examine the phenomenological interpretation offered by Maldiney. We will then explore the conceptual richness of the “dissociation of the body image” in schizophrenia, as disturbances in the imaginary dimension of the body, sense-making and otherness. We shall see that this concept of dissociation of the body image proposes a general theory of paranoid delusion, hallucination and disordered self experience that offers an original perspective in the contemporary psychiatric landscape.

Irene Breuer: Ricœur: The therapeutic function of imagination and representation in configuring a ‘just memory’ – The case Berlin

My proposal deals with the role of both imagination and representation in the configuration of a just memory that can reshape the future. Imagination plays a key role in the working-through of a traumatic past, an issue that is central to Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutic-phenomenological reflections, particularly those contained in his late works *La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli* (2000), *La marque du passé* (1998) and *Parcours de la reconnaissance* (2004). In these works, Ricœur ascribes a new function to historical research, namely a distancing function. An experience of distance, as described by Ricœur, plays a key role in coming to terms with the past, for the success of which the question of a just memory should be combined with the possibility of the gift of forgiveness. Only through forgiveness is it possible to work on memory and grief, which can bring about a ‘general catharsis’. This experience of distance

opens the space for the imaginative reworking of the past: Far from advocating an impossible fidelity to the past, Ricœur emphasizes the necessity of an ‘epistemological cut (*coupure épistémologique*)’ that allows reinterpreting the facts in order to come to terms with the past. Any ethically justified decision on this can only be made against the background of a pre-ethical demand for fidelity, truthfulness and justice. For if history is regarded as ‘finished’ and ‘self-contained’, and the past or tradition takes the form of a ‘dead stock’ or time, it can do justice neither to the experiences of ‘pathological’ injury nor to traumatization, experiences to which collective historicity or societies are exposed. However, when historiography undertakes a critical examination of the truth and memory is integrated into the interrelationship between ‘retrospection and future projection’ by the work of imagination, it fulfils a ‘therapeutic’ and at the same time distancing function. According to Ricœur, bearing witness is suitable for this task: He considers it to be the phenomenon par excellence insofar as, by bearing witness, historical existence receives an appropriate, that is, ethical, response. In the horizon of this question there emerges the ‘riddle of the icon’: For image and imprint are testimonies to both a ‘simple presence’ and a ‘reference to the absent’. In this context, Ricœur enquires into how a ‘reconstruction’ differs from an ‘imaginary or even freely invented construction’, that is, he raises the question of the necessity of the truthfulness of the traces left behind. As a ‘sign-effect’ of the past, the traces are therefore no longer associated with the ‘similarity of an image, but (with) the credibility of a testimony’: Ricœur reverses the problematic by emphasizing that one must ‘think the trace from the testimony’; thus, he links the question of the reliability of testimonies with the problematic of the trace. For Ricœur, the ‘riddle of memory’ boils down to the fact that ‘the imprint reconfigures’, insofar as the image aims for a ‘truth by means of interpretation’. The ‘how’ of representation, which is expressed in an interrelation between ‘memory and fiction in the reconstruction of the past’, amounts to a refiguration or interpretation of the past. As a result of this interrelation between imagination and memory, the question of ‘proof-truth’ shifts to the question of ‘fidelity-truthfulness’, questions that arise from the ‘undecidability of the status of truth-fidelity (*vérité fidélité*). Ricœur therefore does not emphasize a purely historical relationship to the past, but rather a reading of the past that allows imagination to open up new possibilities. For in order for historical consciousness to open up to the future, work on memory, which is ultimately a personal and imaginative work on historical experience, is indispensable. Only by explicitly distancing oneself from the past and thus avoiding being appropriated by what has happened can catharsis take place and consequently something new occur, reshaping thus the future: this is the task and the meaning of a just memory, which is then illustrated by Berlin's narrative handling of the past after the fall of the Wall.

Piero Carreras: Beyond the phenomenon and phenomenon of the beyond. A critical assessment on Emmanuel Falque's *Hors-phénomène* theory

What I propose is a critical assessment of the hors-phénomène theory by Emmanuel Falque. The particular angle I shall explore is that connecting imagination, traumatic experiences, difficulty of the process of phenomenalisation and theological experiences. Amongst the phenomenologists who have dealt with psychopathology, Emmanuel Falque has a strange role. Influenced (amongst others) by Henri Maldiney and by his own experiences in clinics that he discusses in some of his works, he has tried to give a name to the unexperienceable and to what lies beyond the ability to properly constitute “phenomena” and has searched in this same dimension also what can offer salvation to human beings in general. His recent conceptual invention of the hors-phénomène is an aggregate that indicates both an existential dimension where the subject is not able to give sense to the world, and also what remains outside of the phenomenality, in a field that includes both the world itself as what cannot be

achieved phenomenically and the theological (and theolodal) dimension from which a possible salvation may come. While Falque's theory has gained in popularity in recent scholarship, I shall deal with it as a double problem concerning the phenomenology of imagination: on one hand, from how Falque describes this dimension it is never clear how it can be even characterized. In my interpretation, the theory of the hors-phénomène can be assessed from a position of imaginative variation, and this also implies that the hors-phénomène is a form of metaphor of what lies beyond conceptuality, and because of this it can be – phenomenologically – linked to what Hans Blumenberg (who was also an avid reader of Freud) described as *Unbegrifflichkeit*. This would open a completely new perspective, that links the problems of describing through imaginative variation what the hors-phénomène is to the problem of the lifeworld dimension that can be (according to Blumenberg) disclosed through metaphors – which are linked to other form of productive imaginative work. The problem here is in the deep ambiguity of Falque's idea: there's a deep intertwinement between the theolodal experience, the traumatic (and even psychopathological) experiences, and the possibility of salvation, that is developed instead of that of a perspective of a proper "cure". Trying to "think through the exceptional states", Falque's perspective keeps together under the same heading both the after traumatic dimension and the possibility of a theolodal experience. The "destruction of the horizon" and the "impossibility of appearing" are both considered parts of the process of the hors-phénomène, that qualifies the real as the "unattainable". The condition of the hors-phénomène is also what reveals, according to Falque, a "metamorphosed subject", that remains there notwithstanding the phenomenal crisis he's experiencing, in an "original solitude" that is both the crux of being human and an indestructible, unknowable core. Yet, here we are faced with a problem: Falque's original idea has as starting point traumatizing experiences, but does not develop the therapeutic perspective. Following some common ideas (and some common bibliography), but this time by proposing a theoretical reconfiguration of the concept of anguish in a perspective that conjoins historical reconstruction and theoretical development, Stefano Micali has proposed the idea that «in a traumatized person we find the strong tendency to become a living memorial of its own trauma». What Micali proposes is to conceive therapy as a «reconciliation with oneself» towards «what seems to be simply unimaginable in the current condition: in the (long and conflicted) therapeutic journey, the objective (and the hope) is to become able to develop an excentric position in relation to the trauma». Micali also develops better than Falque the embodied perspective, which can be interesting to develop through the perspective of the hors-phénomène theory. Creating a dialogue between these aspects can be useful both for understanding what is still a somewhat enigmatic concept, and to experiment on how it can enter in dialogue with phenomenologies outside of the French "theological" tradition.

Sylvain Dal: Is Paranoïa soluble into Phantasia ?

Paranoia is a psychiatric pathology that classically combines personality traits and the possibility of severe delusional episodes, with themes of persecution and hostility, generated by a process of interpretation. Insofar as some of these elements are based on the imagination, we believe that Husserl's contribution to Phantasia, and in particular to Perceptive Phantasia, can shed some light on this situation. It seems to us that one of the particularities of paranoia, over the elements mentioned above, consists in the genesis of imaginary elements, to which are attributed the status of truth, with no room for doubt. In this respect, the paranoiac imaginary includes elements that are closer to the discontinuity of the "lightning bolt" emergence characteristic of Phantasia, than to visual perception acting in sketches. These few questions may lead to others that are relevant to the psychiatrist: Is there a Phantasia specific to causal representations? How can we understand the marked rigidity of paranoia? Can a detailed

analysis of these elements, made possible by phenomenology, have any therapeutic significance beyond the diagnostic dimension?

István Fazakas, Samuel Thoma, Mathias Pauge: Disturbances of Imagination in Psychopathology and its Promises for Recovery

In this talk, we propose to investigate the role of phantasy and imagination in the creative reinvention of the self, particularly in situations where not only identity but also the pre-reflective experience of the continuity of being is destabilized. Traditionally, imagination and phantasy have been closely associated with psychopathology, often seen as trapping the self in a private world. One possible explanation for this association is that phenomenological psychiatry has historically focused more on describing pathologies than on exploring the possibilities of recovery. However, the phenomenology of psychopathology also opens the way to redefining recovery beyond the framework of the autonomous and self-determined subject and its consciousness—an approach that often prevails in recovery research.

We argue that the phenomenology of imagination can shed light on the pre-reflective structures underlying the creation of narratives, which play a crucial role in shaping narrative identity. We will then show how imagination is anchored in affective structures, particularly in trust, which functions as its generative condition of possibility. To illustrate this thesis, we will draw on a qualitative study we conducted with individuals who have recovered from schizophrenia.

Mathieu Frèrejouan: Imagination in Henri Ey's *Treatise on Hallucinations*

The publication of Henri Ey's *Treatise on Hallucinations* in 1973 marks the culmination of a clinical investigation into the hallucinatory phenomenon that began in the 1930s. Its aim is not only to synthesize psychiatric knowledge on hallucinations from nosological, pathogenic, therapeutic, and even historical perspectives, but also to make sense of it within his own 'organo-dynamic' model.

However, the primary interest of the *Treatise on Hallucinations* lies in offering, beyond its encyclopedic scope, an in-depth analysis of the concept of hallucination, in relation to both perception and imagination. While Ey consensually acknowledges that imagination plays a fundamental role in the genesis of hallucinatory phenomena, he also criticizes any linear or continuity-based conception of hallucination as merely a 'vivid image'—a view that can be found in both neurological and psychodynamic models. For Ey, indeed, 'hallucination is pathological, or it is not': there exists a clear distinction between any hallucinatory phenomenon and the normal activity of imagination.

The aim of this paper is to explore how Ey develops a 'genetic phenomenology' of hallucinatory phenomena (ranging from neurological 'hallucinoses' to the hallucinations of psychosis), which, by acknowledging the existence of a gap between the normal and the pathological, sheds light on their ambivalent relationship with imagination.

Thomas Fuchs: Do we live in the Matrix? On the distinction between reality and virtuality

The distinction between being and appearance, reality and virtuality is of central importance for the human form of consciousness. It manifests itself fundamentally in an awareness of "as-if", which accompanies the activities of fantasy, imagination or image perception as well as dealing with virtual or simulated worlds. However, the distinction is not always successful:

(1) On the one hand, ordinary perception also contains imaginative components that manifest themselves in the endogenous creation of *pre-gestalts* or schemes of possible perception; such pre-gestalts can also overlay or obscure reality as illusions or hallucinations.

(2) On the other hand, illusions or deceptive simulations can also be created exogenously; examples range from the *trompe-l'oeil* of Baroque painting to digitally generated virtual reality.

However, this distinction is also called into question by neuroconstructivist theories, according to which our everyday perception only presents us with a more or less illusionary experience, namely a neuronal simulation of the physical outside world in the brain (Metzinger 2009; Eagleman 2015, and others). David Chalmers (2023) also recently questioned the fundamental distinction between illusion and reality in his book “Reality +”: According to him, digital simulations should also be considered real in principle, and it is even likely that our current reality is just one of many simulations that superior programmers will develop for testing purposes in the future. This brings back the figure of the Genius Malignus, also played out in films such as “Matrix”, whose deceptive world we cannot see through.

In contrast, the lecture will use psychopathological examples to show that undermining the distinction between reality and virtuality not only leads to philosophical aporias, but also to existential abysses and should therefore not be risked lightly.

Ado Huygens: On the fringe of genius and madness: Olivier’s unbearable life.

“I’m a piece of shit and I
can’t imagine he could
love me since he can’t love
a piece of shit.” Olivier

Born in Brussels in the 1960s, Olivier dedicated his life to “art”, to the mystery of creating something that transcends the object. I met Olivier in 1995 because of his insomnia. He was 32 years old. We never interrupted our meetings, now in his studio.

Ever since he was a child, Olivier has felt a strange sensation that shapes his whole way of being-in-the world. Ever since he was a child, he has felt different, strange, and foreign, he has felt that it is not rooted in beings, that it has no foundation. His question is not “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” but “Why does nothingness absorb everything?”

It seems to me essential to listen to Olivier, it means to tune yourself to what he feels and experiences: “a feeling of *Unseiende*”, not to feel founded in beings”. If Heidegger constantly questions Being, beyond a concept, it seems to me that the architectonics of his thought is shaped from ‘*Ab-grund*’ and ‘*Ereignis*’. The ability to ‘ground oneself’ and to ‘be grounded’ is crucial to the process of individuation intertwining with reality. During my talk, I will attempt to develop this idea.

Olivier has always identified with someone sent by God to save the world. Feeling himself as a transcendental entity that exists entirely apart from the body, what suffering does he not experience as soon as he comes face to face with his facticity, his human temporality, he who wants to be immortal, beyond beings? He has constantly resorted to cosmetic surgery to stay young, to avoid ageing.

What happens when a human being cannot enter into a relationship either with a singular being or with the whole of beings? What happens when the only thing that counts is what we could call “Being”, what matters, is his artwork, which must transcend beings in the direction of Being?

In his depressive moments, any projection into the future is polluted by the devastating traces of the past that erase his world, blocking out the open, the possible, the future.

Olivier feels he must rise himself above beings, but, unable to orient himself, being himself the zero point of nothing, he cannot endure the “outside of” while being confined to it. Suddenly, reality collapses or rather its ability to endure it.

Olivier is constantly tearing himself away from any effectiveness that projects him into a presumptuous height with no possible foundation, giving rise only to a tetanizing vertigo, off the edge of any possible encounter.

“The ‘hypersensitivity’, this ‘lability’ is only one facet of the artistic form of being...The path to self-realisation through an artistic form is experienced by moving away from others and from one's own ‘background’, and then returning to others and to oneself via the heights... The way in which these problems are suffered and dealt with determines not only the life and death of the artist, but also the success or failure of the artistic mission itself... Passion consists in this walking close to the abyss that the artistic form of existence represents not only in itself and for itself, but above all for the whole of the artist's existence... authentic height, climbed and inauthentic height, dreamed, imagined, simply desired or even height granted by grace... those who climb can also experience vertigo, and this is a sign of the possibility, inherent in ascending, of falling, of being exposed to danger” (Ludwig BINSWANGER, *Henrik Ibsen und das Problem der Selbstrealisation in der Kunst*, Traduction française par Michel Dupuis et postface du Pr. Henri MALDINEY, pp. 15, 17, 27, 53,61 Personal translation.)

Finally, I'll try to share with you how Olivier's “*existential threefold in-between: Being, beings, nothingness*” (Ado HUYGENS, *L'entre-trois existential* ©, Revue de Psychiatrie Française - Mars 2015, updated version 2022 : <https://www.artdo.be/lentre-trois-existential>) makes its world so threatening that it becomes locked in a spiral of negativity.

Merleau-Ponty, for his part, will help us to understand the extent to which Olivier's bodily foreignness cuts him off from the world and from everyday reality, while paradoxically allowing him to be inhabited by the gesture of painting:

“The thickness of the body, far from rivaling that of the world, is on the contrary the sole means I have to go unto the heart of the things, by making myself a world and by making them flesh.” (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 1959-1961, Translated by Lingis, Northwestern University, 1968, P.135)

A strange interweaving of the forms and formlessness (*Gestaltung*) of his work and his life.

Verstimmt, out of tune with the world,
Olivier wanders in the petrification of the Open
which paradoxically gives itself in his painting...

The unbearable intertwining of genius and madness,
of that which gnaws from within
while it sublimates the gesture of creativity

“It's unbearable, I always feel like I'm going to fall.
Everything gets blurry. I've lost my balance. I can't
stand on the ground. I'm being pulled into the void.
It's awful, this constant dizziness.” Olivier

Seongkyeong Joung: Proto-temporalization/Proto-spatialization of Phantasia in Marc Richir : A Dialogue with Husserl's Analyses of Kinesthesia

This paper examines the proto-temporalization and proto-spatialization of *phantasia* in Marc Richir's phenomenology, engaging critically with Edmund Husserl's analyses of kinesthesia and temporal synthesis.

Critically reconsidering Jean-Toussaint Desanti's reading of Husserl, Richir reintroduces the problem of *hyle* – more specifically, *hyle primaire* – within constitutive time-consciousness. Is it possible to conceive of a purely affective *hyle*—one that is transitory, vanishing along with objectivation, and irreducible to an intentional object? Under what conditions can it be the ultimate reell-immanent content of consciousness? According to Richir, rather than serving as a passive foundation of consciousness, *hyle primaire* operates as a spontaneous 'source' that propels conscious life itself. Unlike Husserl's *ekstasis* of time-consciousness, structured through retention, original impression and protention, this primary *hyle* as *phantasma* temporalizes itself: it is older than itself yet younger, unmemorable yet immature, and belongs to a stratum entirely distinct from the present-oriented temporalization. This *hyle*, at the same time, constitutes both the *Leiblichkeit* and *Leibhaftigkeit*.

Rethinking the role of primary *hyle*, Richir explains the proto-temporalization/spatialization emerging from discontinuity and without a present assignable, thereby reconfiguring Husserl's analyses. Central to Richir's reconstruction is not perception but *phantasia* as an alternative model.

A fundamental rupture in the consistency of Husserl's model of continuous present-centered temporalization arises in his analysis of *phantasia*. For Husserl, such a model must underpin all acts of consciousness, yet *phantasia* appears to resist this structuring. Stressing this point, Richir argues that temporality of *phantasia* emerges not from continuity but from discontinuity itself, making absence the fundamental condition for temporalization. From this perspective, *phantasia* is a domain of instantaneous and transitory appearances, a field of immanent fluctuation where appearance and disappearance govern its temporal dynamics. Rather than simply assuming that perception is fundamentally continuous while *phantasia* is inherently discontinuous—a Husserlian view that relies on perceptual temporalization—Richir instead seeks to ground the temporality of *phantasia* within the temporality of perception itself.

Furthermore, the spatiality of *phantasia* does not conform to the localization of perception. While Husserl's perceptual kinesthesia ensures the coherence of an objectively structured spatial world, Richir explains how *phantasia* generates its own proto-spatialization through kinesthetic processes distinct from actual bodily movement. This occurs through the *Phantasieleib*, a phantasized body that engages in an unstable kinesthetic process, neither fully integrating into the external world nor completely detaching from bodily movement. Instead, it opens a space where meaning emerges beyond physical constraints, as seen in aesthetic experience. This non-localizable *Phantasieleib* is distinct from the *Phantomleib*, a pathological state wherein bodily spatiality disintegrates. However, *Phantasieleib* provides a clue to explain how a self-affection and embodied synthesis can be disrupted, leading to pathological states.

Husserl differentiates the temporal and spatial structures of *phantasia* from those of perception, yet his position on the temporality of the *act* of *phantasia* itself remains undecided: his analyses reveal an unresolved tension regarding the act of *phantasia* follows the same continuous temporalization as perceptive experience or whether it operates through a different mode of time-consciousness. This is precisely where Richir's distinctive analysis begins.

This paper argues that Husserl's present-centered model and Richir's notion of *présence sans présent assignable* are not necessarily opposed but reflect the dual structure of *phantasia*. Moreover, engaging with Richir, we explore how the discontinuity and non-present of the

phantasizing act itself might serve as a fundamental condition for the phenomenalization of phenomenality.

Sebastian Lederle: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's worldly imagination and its closed future

In a first step, the presentation reconstructs Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of a worldly, desubjectivizing or subject-decentrating imagination. In a second step, the question is raised as to what extent the pre-subjective imagination in Merleau-Ponty's starting point must be thought of today as a technical, highly regulated operation.

In a marginal note in his book *The Prose of the World* Merleau-Ponty writes that the imaginary resides in the world. At first glance, this seems counterintuitive: how can that which does not exist and cannot be found anywhere, be at home in the world of all places? Isn't our connection to the world precisely because we share the perception of the things in it with everyone else? Therefore, we are assured, we are tempted to suggest, that we are in contact with the world and not entrapped in entirely made up or merely imagined phantasma? According to mentalistic and subjectivity theory assumptions, that which is imagined also appears to be that which weakens or even interrupts the common reference to the world shared with others. It cannot be perceived, smelled, touched, seen or changed by everyone else. Whoever imagines something is not with things, but where all others are not and cannot be. Therefore, imagination is always in suspicion of being epistemically unsolid and leading to a withdrawing from community.

In *The Visible and the Invisible* in particular, Merleau-Ponty opposes the displacement of the imagined or imaginable into a subjective, non-binding interior space by thinking invisibility as part of the world and liberating it from its reduction to the invisibility of pure thought and seemingly worldless imagination. Even that which cannot be seen by everyone belongs to the world, its texture and its relief. Imagination is, according to Merleau-Ponty, embedded in it and eludes the subject-object and the imagined-real dichotomy. Instead of seeing imagination as a human ability, Merleau-Ponty is concerned with understanding it as something through which an unfinished world is articulated for the human. Because the world is not finished and still in the making, the act of imagining can be something real in the world and not merely an inner, solipsistic process in the subject. In the act of imagining the world's openness affects human thinking and acting in general.

Being directed to what is not shows the openness of the world, that manifest itself in the medium of human imagination. It is to be understood as a power that informs time and space as an open, unfinished event. Imagination as part of a world in the process of becoming is what allows to reach beyond time as a mere point in time bound by presentism into a realm beyond retention and memory or protention and expectation. Imagination places one outside a specific regime of time and space that is governed by a predictive relation to the future and a relation to the past only looking for affirmation and legitimation for the present. Imagination as an effect decenters the spatiotemporal restrictions imposed by presentism: What is the present more and different than what it is able to control, predict and subject? Imagination reshapes the face of being in the present in an unforeseeable way by exposing the non-identity of the present with itself: It does not fully belong to itself and therefore is always out of place and time.

One cannot grasp this inversion by imagination by fleeing into pure thinking, which only understands space and time as abstract quantities to which the respective person can be assigned as a point in space and time. Rather, one is already positioned in space and time; one is already spatialized and temporalized by the world. And that is why one can imagine oneself in a different place and time. Only because one is already displaced through space and time ("spacing", "timing") does a person have scope for imaginary displacement.

In this sense, the effect of decentering and creating an outside, imagination and madness still are intertwined, because the restructuring the coordinates of the world, that cannot be predicted or fully steered, but disrupts the well-established and valid ways of thinking, acting and feeling – and not least the imagination of the limits of what is possible and real, thinkable and unthinkable, allowed and forbidden in a world. The effects of this interruption, which imagination brings about as soon as it is no longer understood as a subjective faculty but as a reality (trans)forming power, cannot by definition be immediately normalized or become part of an adaptive project. Although this is initiated by imaginative transformation, it cannot be caught up with by it. Therefore, there is always a precarious gap between the effects of interruption and transformation and the imagination regimes in charge. Imagination is inherently divided, open and precarious because it is self-contradictory: It is the antagonism in the prevailing ideas, beliefs and habits, insofar as these are always underpinned, structured and limited by an imaginative horizon, which, however, repeatedly disrupts, interrupts and sets it in motion in unforeseeable ways. Imagination as interruption and transformation is neither the simple covariance of the horizon line nor the shifting of the horizon, but its traversal. It unsettles the here and now and makes it fragile and unstable.

This can be seen in the involuntariness, unpredictability and uncontrollability of the imagination and its objects. This is not about the blind turmoil, as Kant called it, which must be categorically and conceptually brought into order. For Merleau-Ponty, the involuntary, uncontrollable and incalculable effects of the imagination decenter the subject by undermining the inner-outer boundary and testifying to a passive, prior, living affiliation to the world. So what is called madness indicates what does not coincide in the world, but is made to disappear as irregular, maladapted or deviant. This belonging is not an achievement of the subject but is described by Merleau-Ponty as flesh. The flesh is an anonymous, a-centric and pre-subjective context that pervades, and traverses thought and action. In a certain sense, it is a virtual realm from which that, which is at work in concrete acts of imagination originates: Not the realization of a possibility as the act of a subject, but the incarnate possibilization as such i.e. the event through which possibilities come into the world in the first place: The outside of the here and now, which is real and unreal at the same time.

Against the background of the anonymous event character of the imagination, the question arises as to whether the openness of the flesh today has not already been replaced by a technologized infrastructure and the worldly moments of imagination are controlled by chains of operations that have no originator, but also run anonymously. This will be briefly discussed by drawing upon concepts of "protocol power" (Alexander Galloway) and "dis-correlation" (Shane Denson). The claim is: The zone of the flesh is already occupied by a certain production and regulation of behaviour before it is actualized in the human being in incalculable imaginative processes. The question that subsequently arises is: What future does a technified imagination have, if it should be significantly different from the open future of a world in the making? Is it a closed future and therefore not a future at all?

Dorothee Legrand: Truth? On the Temporal Thickness of Mental Constructions

If we trust “the certain insight that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect” (as Freud wrote to Fliess), and if, in the conscious dimension, the encounter between a clinician and a patient excludes the search for any proof that what is said is factual or not, then, in which sense could a clinical stance be guided by a “love of truth” – as Freud said about psychoanalysis? I will explore the manners in which clinicians and patients may rely on the “kernel of truth” which may form the core of fantasies, fictions, phantoms, delusions... Considering their temporal thickness, I will consider what may survive in such mental constructions.

Kasper Møller Nielsen: Pseudohallucination: Flogging a Dead Horse

The concept of pseudohallucination is commonly defined as hallucinations with insight and/or vivid mental imagery in inner space. The concept of pseudohallucination is seen by many authors as unhelpful given its vagueness and ambiguity—and it probably belongs in the wastepaper basket, as Denning and Berrios (1996) claim. In this talk, I will also accept this viewpoint. However, even if the concept is unhelpful, I will argue that the extension of the concept still concerns a crucial aspect of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSD). The latter conceptualization, as vivid mental imagery in inner space, is especially found in the work of Kandinsky and Jaspers' early papers before *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* (1913). These early papers by Jaspers primarily concern discussions of false perception (*Trugwahrnehmung*) and the concept of reality, which through *Allgemeine Psychopathologie*, still has an impact on contemporary psychiatry. It is also in these papers that Jaspers argues that an abyss separates pseudohallucinations from real hallucinations. One may, however, challenge this view, especially considering recent work on anomalous imagination in SSD. In this talk, I will return to these original works on pseudohallucination and anomalous imagination, and revitalize them by comparing them to contemporary theoretical and empirical work on anomalous imagination and deformation of inner space in SSD. This comparison will make us reconsider Jaspers' idea that an abyss separates pseudohallucinations from real hallucinations. Furthermore, this exploration may also challenge the textbook definition of hallucination in SSD. The bulk of hallucinations in SSD are probably not false perceptions without an external object but rather concern a plethora of perception-like experiences, related to anomalous imagination and a deformation of inner space. I will argue that the problematic intension of the concept of pseudohallucination probably primarily roots in the simplicity by which we categorize hallucinations. A more thorough understanding of these variegated forms of perception-like experiences may also have implications for the research on neurobiological correlates and modalities of psychotherapy that often operate with the textbook definition of hallucination.

Aurélien Névot: The shaman, psychotic “hensch(wo)man of the imagination”? Rethinking the shamanic “state” through the Richirian *Phantasia* and *Leib* (and vice versa)

In June 2024, at the end of the last symposium of the International Society for Academic Research on Shamanism (ISARS), a shaman suddenly took the floor, in tears, sharing her distress with the stunned audience, reproaching it for reporting on shamanic practices only in an ethnographic and analytical way, without ever mentioning the suffering inherent in the shamanic function, which is not a matter of choice. While they do not ignore it, the anthropologists do not have indeed to study the psychology of shamans. In the space of a century, studies on shamanism have in fact gone from a pronounced interest in the psyche to cognitivist approaches, in order to “put an end to trance and ecstasy” (R. Hamayon), which we are never quite sure what to do with. The embarrassment is there.

After a brief review of some of shamanic psychopathologizing studies, I propose to address this shamanic “suffering” through anthropological and phenomenological approaches. For shamans are indeed pathological beings: people who may have taken up their functions following an illness, social disabilities, who may hear voices and have visions, who therefore have a special relationship with the invisible and with what is known as “the imaginary”. In their society, this “out of the ordinary” state is not taken negatively, but is read as the expression of a peculiar relationship with the spirits: these people have been chosen and must respond to the latter's call in order, at best, to avoid their wrath, and at worst, to avoid death. Becoming a shaman then involves a number of transformations that affect the body, which is reworked in

such a way that it engenders and is engendered, provoking an openness to bodily otherness (of oneself included) and, more broadly, extracorporeal otherness, which implies investing a field beyond the human.

Drawing on various examples from Korea, India and more particularly from China, I will attempt to question the shamanic body with reference to certain passages in *Méditations phénoménologiques* (p. 19, p. 36), in which Marc Richir points out that schizophrenics do not feel any split within oneself, any gap between oneself and oneself, any internal division between the *in* and the *aus* of their *Leib*, so much so that they take everything head-on, directly, without the ability to set aside the object as the self as subject. And yet, it is remarkable that becoming a shaman consists precisely in splitting the self, in constructing through the body a self *in* and *aus* (in richirian language). In this double movement, they heal themselves and become healers all at once by opening their body to the spirits (the extreme version of the *aus*), which must be ritually experienced. Ritual may thus be seen as a moment of (re)enactment of the vital gap; it is realized for others, and therefore socially, through the shamanic body, which then (re)creates its *in* and *aus*. By getting a ritual body and a ritual status, the shaman literally survives.

Delia Popa: Fragile Forms of Life

If we agree with Enzo Paci that history is the progressive self-revelation and self-realization of what, in human life, is hidden, imagination has an important role to play in this process that unfolds at several levels of our experience. While the eidetic function of imagination seems to be involved first in this process of historical disclosure, I would like to examine its affective dimension, as it is manifested in everyday gestures and in the sedimentation of our forms of life. I will start by exploring the relationship between gestures and images, in order to highlight how they can help build a phenomenological investigation of forms of life. I will then focus on the contribution of imagination and phantasy to the way in which existing forms of life are questioned and transformed, but also to the way in which they are grounded and maintained in times of historical and existential crisis. I will end my presentation with a reflection on the intrinsic fragility of human forms of life.

Belkis Rabie: Realms of imagination and madness in schizophrenia: An Ode to What Remains.

Far from being reduced to a simple loss of contact with reality, madness in schizophrenia highlights a particular form of subjectivity, where imagination and delusions are attempts to reorganize the *lifeworld*. In its Sartrean conception, *imagination* is fundamentally a reduction of *being*, reducing the object to a mere ontological nothing. However, the realm of imagination cannot be a simple empty abstraction because it is based on reality and can create new possibilities, allowing consciousness to project beyond what exists in the immediate world and recreate *existing* in a different form.

Through Husserl's theories of intentionality and by proposing an original rereading of Sartre's conception of imagination, we examine how, in schizophrenia, imagination becomes a modality of being in the world, revealing the subject's war to maintain a form of coherence. Although the schizophrenic individual is both creator and spectator of his mental realm, imaginary experiences, far from testifying to the total breakdown of the self, reveal a form of resistance: the schizophrenic subject continues to structure his inner world according to its own logic, even if it escapes social norms or shared reality. Imagination, thus, becomes a dimension of lived experience that testifies to the persistence of subjectivity, seeking to unify itself through representations and meanings of its own but coherent to the subject.

The conception of imagination as a form of an *extension of reality*—since it does not entirely deny it but reorganizes it according to the intentions of consciousness—offers an unexplored alternative for rethinking the *schizophrenic “self”* at the mercy of its mind. In conclusion, we argue that imagination in schizophrenia, as an explosion of experienced reality, is a form of self-expression that, despite its fragmentation, exists within this paradox. Even in madness, the self never wholly disappears but continues to be, to manifest itself, to emerge, and to *remain*.

Andreas Rosén Rasmussen: A clinical-phenomenological exploration of imagination and selfhood in the schizophrenia spectrum: Disturbances and promises

Several important concepts in 20th century psychopathology involved imagination and its disturbances. These include schizophrenic autism, first conceptualized by E. Bleuler and subsequently further explored by E. Minkowski and others, K. Jaspers’ notion of pseudo-hallucination, and the pseudo-obsessive phenomena. Today, these notions have almost completely disappeared from mainstream psychopathology, which lacks concepts to address these phenomena. In this presentation, I will discuss subjective disturbances of imagination in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. My colleagues and I have explored these experiential alterations in clinical-phenomenological studies informed by resources from phenomenology and philosophy of mind. This has led to the construction of a semi-structured interview guide, the Examination of Anomalous Fantasy and Imagination (EAFI), as a framework to explore such experiences clinically. We found that patients with schizophrenia very often describe a characteristic spatialization of imagination in which mental images are experienced with a sense of spatiotemporal constancy, explorability, autonomy, and experiential distance within subjectivity. Moreover, patients report a variety of subtle and transient disturbances of the tacit discrimination of imagination from other modalities such as memory. Fantasies may involve aggressive or macabre content but also pleasant and meaningful themes. Often, various daydreams and fantasies appear to enact a fundamental transformation of metaphysical hierarchies and the person’s experiential framework, including solipsistic modes of experiencing. I will address the relation of these subjective disturbances of imagination to disorders of minimal self (unstable ipseity or first-personal manifestation of experience). Finally, I will discuss to what extent these disorders leave room for a potential role of imagination in recovery processes.

Alexander Schnell: The role of phantasy and imagination in sense formation

The aim of this contribution is to explain the role of fantasy and transcendental imagination in the process of meaning formation. The historical and systematic background are the new developments within phenomenology since the 1960s. Various perspectives will be developed that particularly counter the primacy of objectifying intentionality and perception over imaginary intentional operations.

Mauro Senatore: Blues Hope: Phantasy in Traumatic Reenactment

A strange solidarity can be found between classical psychological approaches to traumatic experiences (Janet, Freud) and the phenomenological account of the pathologies of the imaginary. This is not by accident, I will argue. On the one hand, psychological approaches, despite more or less serious differences, are informed by the idea of a dissociation of the traumatized person from itself and the activation of an automatic or unconscious experience. On the other hand, the phenomenology of imagination places the pathological in a special case

of autonomization of the experience of the imagined subject (with respect to the imagining subject) and, consequently, in the a-subjective character of the imaginative intentionalities at work. It is from this perspective that we may read Marc Richir's phenomenological analyses of mental illness in *Phantasia, imagination, affectivité* (2004), as the most accomplished development of the aforementioned convergence. In an exemplary fashion, these analyses interweave the phenomenology of imagination with the psychoanalytic approach to traumatic experiences developed in Freud's overall work on hysteria. In my talk, I would like to focus on some cases of traumatic experience that cannot be fully described by this articulation. In these cases, the traumatized person does not merely undergo an automatic or unconscious experience nor a pathological development of imagination. Rather, we may speculate that she survives her trauma by engaging in a somehow conscious relation with the latter and setting in motion an imaginative creation of worlds to come. I will attempt to develop the phenomenology of these cases by resorting to varying critical resources from psychological and phenomenological tradition and beyond.

Claudia Șerban, Sofia Zuccoli: Disturbances and Promises of Maternal Imagination: historical epistemology and phenomenological analysis

Our presentation will approach the question of the powers and troubles of maternal imagination in two parts. Firstly, it will examine the reasons why, at the end of the Renaissance and during the early modern period, imagination is invested with exceptional concern on the part of scholars. In a set of discourses that blurred the boundaries between medicine, philosophy and natural magic, imagination was approached through the prism of its active, transitive properties: it appeared as a power that can produce effects on the subject's own body, but also act on the psyche and the bodies of the others. In particular, in the writings of early modern physicians, we find a truly gendered theory of the imagination and a predominantly negative characterization of the feminine mind, as shown by the theory of the effects of maternal imagination on the fetus. The second part of our paper will examine the surprising reactualization of this theory of the "maternal imprint" in contemporary discourses through two singularly different channels: neuroscientific and epigenetic research, on the one hand, and the psychoanalysis of motherhood, on the other. While all these discourses raise the twofold question of feminine passivity and agentivity, they also invite us to reflect on how imagination is inscribed within the body, how it can function intersubjectively, how it relates to the future and how it is bonded to desire.

Andreea Smaranda Aldea: Limits, Thresholds, Lived Impossibilities – A Phenomenological Account of Imaginative Resistance

Imaginative resistance – the experience of 'I cannot' endorse imaginary scenarios contrary to or radically departing from my ethical commitments – is a phenomenon widely studied and discussed in analytic philosophy of modalities (Gendler 2010). However, the phenomenon has received little attention in phenomenology, with few exceptions (Szanto, 2019). In this paper, I seek to explicate imaginative resistance through the lens of Husserl's synthetic-genetic and generative methods of analysis in order to both bring into relief its broader constitutive scope and to further specify its qualitatively distinctive structures of sense-making.

Through this methodological framework, I will show that the intentional scope of imaginative resistance is broader than mere resistance to stark moral deviance in a fictional setting, though the latter can be treated as a sub-case of imaginative resistance broadly construed. Moreover, drawing on my previous work on imaginative modification and its distinctive normative and teleological dimensions, I will show that imaginative resistance

involves a specific failure of modification, namely, the ‘imagining I cannot’ pertaining to imaginative resistance involves both inability and unwillingness in complex, co-constituting ways. Understanding the structures of passivity, habituation, and sense institution at work in the sedimenting processes pertaining to imaginative resistance is key here in a twofold sense.

First, the phenomenon of imaginative resistance is not so much a matter of conflict, a mere ‘puzzle’ dependent on a stark belief/make-belief binary (as the analytic philosophy of modalities would have it), but a matter of experiencing limits as well as lost and/or foreclosed possibilities (i.e., lived impossibilities) as thresholds, that is, in a manner that can lead to uncovering as well as fissuring the very conditions undergirding these systems of modalities in the first place. On my model, imagining consciousness is very much a lifeworld-anchored affair. As a result, imaginative resistance, as an experience of thresholds, can open the possibility of a ‘radical’ self-reflection capable of re-orienting us in our everyday projects and endeavors. Thresholds can become points of no return.

Second, imaginative resistance is revelatory of ‘depth problems’ understood as *Sinnstiftungen* undergirding self- and lifeworld-articulations and, as a result, it is also able to shed light on how certain transcendently necessary structures of *Sinnbildung* sediment and ossify. Clarifying this phenomenon can thus also have significant methodological implications for phenomenology itself. In the end, what transpires is both the normative and teleological import of imaginative resistance in everyday life and the opportunity it grants us, as a distinctive kind of lived experience, for radical methodological reflections on central phenomenological commitments, such as the commitment to transcendental necessity eidetically construed.

Helene Stephensen: Double Bookkeeping, Imagination, and Schizophrenia: Psychotherapeutic Reflections on Poetic Space

This paper explores the phenomenon of *double bookkeeping* in schizophrenia and psychosis, focusing on its relationship to imagination. Double bookkeeping refers to the experience of simultaneously inhabiting two incommensurable dimensions of reality: a shared everyday reality and a private, sometimes psychotic reality that often holds a different ontological quality. Rather than two distinct, isolated worlds, these dimensions are better understood as incommensurable registers reflecting the ambiguous nature of reality itself. This raises the question of how we might approach the transitional space or borderland between psychotic experience and imagination.

The paper will present empirical material illustrating how patients engaged imagination and creativity in navigating this in-between existence. The material is based on a phenomenological-empirical study on double bookkeeping comprising qualitative interviews with 25 individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSD). Participants reported that their daydreams, artistic activities, or fantasy lives often intersected with their psychotic experiences. For some, their artistic endeavors were guided by psychotic experience such as hallucinatory voices or “visions.” Others expressed the precariousness of this interplay, articulating that delving too deeply into imaginative processes risked crossing a threshold resulting in severe psychotic episodes. Imagination, then, emerges as both a bridge between registers of reality and a site of potential danger.

Following Kierkegaard, we can conceive of imagination as not merely a representational faculty for fantastic thinking but as a capacity *instar omnium* pivotal for the constitution of subjectivity. Imagination is the capacity to transcend the realm of the concrete and actual as well as functioning as a mediator between the contradictory aspects of existence (e.g., necessity-possibility; temporal-eternal; singular-universal). In the context of schizophrenia, imagination can serve as a transformative and creative force, offering individuals means to articulate experiences that otherwise resist conventional language or logic. However, imagination comes

at a risk, as individuals may lose footing in the shared world or get trapped in labyrinthic makings of their own mind.

Finally, the paper will discuss the implications of this perspective for psychotherapy. Rather than solely aiming to eliminate psychotic symptoms, psychotherapy may offer a *poetic space*, serving as a bridging force to support patients in maintaining a balance between realities.

Mari van Stokkum: The imaginative structure of reality: a critique of Husserl

Husserl's analyses of imagination in *Husserliana* 23 establish a strong connection to artistic forms such as paintings, fairy tales, and theatrical plays. This approach reflects a Romantic alignment of imagination with art. Such an alignment can ultimately be traced back to Baumgarten's foundational work in aesthetics, which blurred the lines between the psychology of imagination and theory of art (cf. *Aesthetica*, §424). However, Husserl also extends the argument initiated in *Ideas I*, which maintains a rigid distinction between imagination and perception (Hua3, §111).

Husserl's exploration of fantasy through a distinct "aesthetic attitude" (Hua23, 236) aligns with a tradition that evaluates fantasy based on its artistic expressions, which can be separated from everyday practical concerns. We enter the realm of fantasy through a "suspension of disbelief" (*Ausschaltung des Unglaubens*), which modifies our ordinary experience of the world (*ibid.*, 382; cf. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, ch. 14).

Thus, Husserl appears to underestimate the extent to which imagination informs our entire engagement with reality and is integral to perception. The question "Is this real or am I just imagining things?" underscores the intrinsic connection between imagination and perception, especially in moments of doubt or uncertainty. This interplay is, of course, particularly significant in the context of psychoanalysis and psychopathology.

Freudian analysis, beginning with *The Interpretation of Dreams* (GW2/3), reveals that dreams and free associations manifest problem-solving attitudes deeply rooted in our social and relational contexts. This challenges the Romantic paradigm and paves the way for what could be termed a Modernist paradigm. Yet, phenomenologists have struggled to capture this form of imagination within everyday life, which exists independently of any artistic intention. This is why Freud, although not a phenomenologist, has set a benchmark for phenomenology with his effortless descriptions of the interplay between fantasy and reality.

Our engagement with reality is, at its basis, an imaginative effort that exhibits not only playfulness but also a certain rigidity. This insight is obscured when imagination is viewed mainly through the lens of artistic creation. De Man critiqued the Romantic assumption that imagination is inherently tied to artistic genius (De Man 1983). Freud took a different approach by treating artworks as expressions of unconscious desires, which are universal and not inherently artistic (GW7, 213ff). In both approaches, we find the contours of a Modernist critique of Romanticism, one that phenomenology must engage with if it is to adequately describe human experience.

Tamás Ullmann: Body, fantasy and schizophrenia

My presentation tries first to explore the links that can be discovered between body experiences and fantasy. First and foremost, a phenomenological analysis of body image and body schema will be taken as a starting point. If we distinguish between direct bodily experience on one hand and body image or body schema on the other, it seems that the latter requires the intervention of the imagination. Both body image and body schema are, at least to a certain extent, fantasmatic constructs.

In the second step, I will try to demonstrate this claim by means of empirical/phenomenological experiences that disrupt the unity of body schema and body image and thereby show that these unities are mainly due to the activity of fantasy. In this context, the disorders of schizophrenia seem to be the most illuminating: somatic delusions about alienation of self and body (self belongs to someone else, body is a machine), loss of control (body boundaries are not solid, anything can get in and anything can get out), distortion (members change size, position, state) and malfunction (organ dysfunction or overfunction), etc. The peculiarity of these experiences is not that they indicate an unleashing of the imagination, but on the contrary, a diminution of the integrating and shaping power of the imagination. The disjointed experience of schizophrenic states is precisely one of the negative ways in which the "normal body experience" reveals itself as deeply permeated by fantasy constructs.

In the third step of the presentation, I will try to show which are the phenomenologically detectable points where phantasy is involved in the phenomenological experience of the body (unit formation, separation of interior and exterior, proportion and ordering of members, etc.) I draw on classical phenomenology of body experiences and fantasy (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Richir) and on contemporary psychiatric, psychological, existential philosophical descriptions of schizophrenia (Fuchs, Gallagher, Parnas, Sass).

Iván Vial: The alien voice as hyperreversibility between hearing and inner speech

In this presentation, I outline a novel phenomenological approach to understanding the "alien voice" or auditory verbal hallucination (AVH). Despite the considerable variability in their presentation, recent empirical research on the experiential features of hearing voices indicates two central and seemingly paradoxical aspects. On the one hand, they are experienced as both 'alien to self' and 'belonging to self.' On the other hand, they appear to fluctuate between being perceived as loud or 'sound-like' and silent or 'thought-like'. This presents a twofold challenge: firstly, to comprehend how the relation between the self and the alien must be understood in order for the alien voice to emerge, and secondly, to elucidate the relation between hearing sound and thinking in order to explain how AVH can oscillate between silent and loud manifestations.

I perform the analysis in three steps. First, I explore the self-alien relation in hearing outer sounds and voices and in hearing oneself speak. It is argued that the bodily self that is revealed through hearing exhibits an intricate interplay between self and alien moments, thereby delineating particular forms of alienation. Second, the relationship between hearing and thinking is explored through inner speech. It is argued that inner and outer speech are interconnected through the body, something mirrored in the kinesthetic sensations and the acoustic trace of inner speech. Then, it is argued that inner speech also displays a self-alien relationship; inner speech incorporates the voices of others, something mirrored in the critical voice of the super-ego. Third, I sketch a phenomenological proposal on the AVH. The alien voice emerges as the product of an underlying *hyperreversibility* in the self-alien and hearing-thinking relations, i.e., the capacity of one's own voice to reverse into an alien voice, and inner speech to reverse into a sonorous voice. The hyperreversibility view is argued to facilitate a linkage between AVH and other symptoms of schizophrenia, such as thought insertion, thoughts aloud, and transitivity.

Bryan Francisco Zúñiga Iturra: Psychopathologies as Disorders of the Imaginary: An Approach from Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology

Considering the crisis of reason that underpins much of 20th-century philosophical production, phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty formulates a proposal to redefine human rationality

in light of what constantly confronts its limits—namely, the imaginary dimension that constitutes its counterpart. Framed in this context, the present proposal pursues a dual objective. On the one hand, it seeks to explore the tension—without synthesis or resolution—between the rational, the perceptive, and the imaginary in Merleau-Ponty's thought. On the other hand, it intends to demonstrate that the notion of the imaginary developed by the author provides a critical framework for describing the experience of the world implicated in psychopathological phenomena such as depression, schizophrenia, and eating disorders. Thus, the main question of this reflection is: *To what extent can we assert, following Merleau-Ponty, that psychopathologies are disorders triggered by a disruption in the imaginary dimension of our experience?* To answer this question, the discussion will unfold in three stages.

First, reading *Le primat de la perception* and *Phénoménologie de la perception*, we will outline the philosophical intent of Merleau-Ponty's project as one fundamentally dedicated to rethinking the human condition by redefining rationality. Second, based on an exegesis of the first part of *Le visible et l'invisible*, we will argue, following the author, that since “indeterminacy” is a pervasive feature of all perceptual experiences—and the imaginary is that dimension of the lived experience that allows us to apprehend this indeterminacy laterally.

Finally, to illustrate the potential applicability of this conceptual framework to the analysis of psychopathologies, we will examine various clinical cases discussed in Merleau-Ponty's work. This analysis aims to highlight that, contrary to the dominant sense-making frameworks of daily life, the absence of the illusion and indeterminacy characteristic of the imaginary apprehension of the real is not indicative of a “non-psychopathological” experience but is its defining hallmark.